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Northwest Wholesale: Group Boycott Analysis and a
Role for Procedural Safeguards in Industrial
Self-Regulation
In 1978, the Pacific Stationery and Printing Company (Pacific Stationery) was
expelled from the membership of the Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Incorporated
(Northwest Wholesale).' Pacific Stationery sells both retail and wholesale office
supplies, 2 and Northwest Wholesale is a not-for-profit purchasing cooperative which
purchases office supplies at substantial volume discounts and resells them, provides
its members with wholesale storage facilities, and distributes its profits to its
members. 3 This profit distribution lowers the price the members pay for Northwest's
wholesale supplies and effectively constitutes a price discrimination in their favor.4
The expulsion of Pacific Stationery was unaccompanied by any procedural safeguards
and, as a result, Pacific Stationery lost access to the benefits of cooperative
membership, including the cooperative's profit distributions. 5 Pacific Stationery
brought suit against Northwest Wholesale, alleging a violation of the federal antitrust
laws.6
Pacific Stationery alleged that expulsion from the trade association constituted a
group boycott,7 an activity generally illegal per se under the federal antitrust laws. 8
Northwest Wholesale, however, argued that its self-regulatory activities qualified for
an exception to the per se rule against group boycotts. 9 Under the Supreme Court's
1. Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co., 105 S. Ct. 2613, 2616 (1985).
2. Id. at 2615.
3. Id..
4. Id. at 2615 & n.2. Legally, price discrimination occurs when one buyer pays a different price from that paid
by anotherbuyer for goods of like grade and quality. In economic terms, price discrimination is present if the ratio of price
to marginal cost differs from one sale to the next, and the seller earns different rates of return. H. Hovasmo.ow, Ecoao.wcs
AND FrEsu. Asmmusr LAw § 13.1 (1985). In Northwest Wholesale, the cooperative sold office supplies to retailers at a
uniform price without regard to whether they were members or nonmembers. At the end of each year, however, the
cooperative would distribute its profits "in the form of a percentage rebate on purchases." Northwest Wholesale
Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co., 105 S. Ct. 2613, 2615 (1985). The effect of this practice was
discriminatory pricing in favor of cooperative members. Id. at 2615 n.2. Price discrimination is generally contrary to the
antitrust laws when it substantially lessens competition, but in the context of a cooperative profit distribution it is expressly
allowed by Section Four of the Robinson-Patman Act. Id. at 2615 & n.2.
5. See 105 S. Ct. 2613, 2615-16 (1985). As the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals noted, Pacific Stationery lost
access to Northwest Wholesale's rebate policy, to Northwest Wholesale's "superior warehousing and expedited
order-filling facilities," and to any benefits that are derived from being known as a member of "an established
cooperative." Pacific Stationery & Printing Co. v. Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc., 715 F.2d 1393, 1395 (9th Cir.
1983), rev'd, 105 S. Ct. 2613 (1985).
6. 105 S. Ct. 2613, 2616 (1985). Pacific Stationery alleged a violation of Section One of the Sherman Act, which
provides in relevant part: "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of
trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal." 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
7. 105 S. Ct. 2613, 2616 (1985).
8. See United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966); Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc.,
359 U.S. 207 (1959). See generally Hovmrc.'., supra note 4, at §§ 10.1-.2.
9. As will be demonstrated, two inquiries arc necessary in this regard. First, it must be determined whether
Northwest Wholesale's activities constituted a group boycott warranting application of the per se rule. If no likelihood of
anticompetitive effects is found, then the rule of reason would be appropriate. See infra notes 57-70 and accompanying
text. Second, even if the per se rule applies, it must be determined whether the boycott nevertheless should be exempted
from the per se rule under a partial repeal of the Sherman Act. In this case, the partial repeal would stem from a mandate
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seminal antitrust opinion in Silver v. New York Stock Exchange,'0 industry self-
regulation that might normally constitute a group boycott is removed from per se
analysis if such regulation is exercised pursuant to a mandate of self-regulatory
power."I Such a mandate can be either derived from a statute or found inherent in the
structure of the industry. 12 The possible sources of Northwest Wholesale's mandate
include the Robinson-Patman Act, 13 which expressly exempts profit distribution by
trade associations from its prohibitions against price discrimination, 14 and the nature
of trade associations in the competitive process.15
Pacific Stationery argued that an exercise of self-regulatory power by a trade
association, resulting in a denial of the benefits of cooperative membership, should
be considered per se illegal unless accompanied by procedural safeguards. 16 This
procedural requirement apparently was derived from the Supreme Court's Silver
opinion. 17
Although the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found that the trade association had
violated the Sherman Act,' 8 the Supreme Court, in Northwest Wholesale Stationers,
Inc. v. Pacific Stationery and Printing Co.,19 unanimously concluded that the
absence of procedural safeguards was not determinative20 and that the cooperative's
activity was not a group boycott warranting per se analysis. 21 The Court distinguished
Silver's requirement of due process by asserting that Silver had involved a broad
statutory mandate for industry self-regulation and that no such mandate was provided
by the Robinson-Patman Act. 22 Implicit in the Court's opinion is a refusal to require
procedural safeguards when industry self-regulation is mandated by industry struc-
ture.
23
This Comment will show that the Court's analysis unnecessarily compromises
the effectiveness of the antitrust laws. The self-regulatory activities of Northwest
Wholesale may have constituted a group boycott that, absent some intervening
mandate of self-regulatory power, might warrant treatment as a per se violation of the
Sherman Act. 24 Although the Robinson-Patman Act or the nature of trade associa-
for self-regulation. See infra notes 71-111 and accompanying text.
10. 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
11. See id. at 360-61.
12. Id. at 348-49. See also infra note 15.
13. Robinson-Patman Price Discrimination Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 13, 13a, 13b, 21a (1982).
14. See id. at § 13b (1982). See also supra note 4.
15. The Silver opinion refers to the possible sources of a mandate for self-regulation as "statute or otherwise."
Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 348-49 (1963). The "or otherwise language" has been interpreted as
including mandates required by an industry's structure. Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Management, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1049,
1064-65 (C.D. Cal. 1971). See also Note, Trade Association Exclusionary Practices: An Affirmative Role for the Rule
of Reason, 66 CoLrs. L. Rav. 1486 (1966).
16. Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co., 105 S. Ct. 2613, 2616 (1985).
17. Id.
18. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co. v. Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc., 715 F.2d 1393 (9th Cir. 1983),
rev'd, 105 S. Ct. 2613 (1985).
19. 105 S. Ct. 2613 (1985).
20. Id. at 2619.
21. Id. at 2621.
22. Id. at 2618-19.
23. See infra note 211 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 157-84 and accompanying text.
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tions might justify such activity and remove it from per se invalidation,25 Northwest
Wholesale or trade associations in general should not be allowed to do so in this
instance because the powers they would sanction were employed without procedural
safeguards. 26 Whenever an industry or market actor is authorized, whether by statute
or otherwise, to engage in self-regulatory practices that normally constitute a group
boycott in violation of the Sherman Act, the actor should be required to provide due
process for those subject to the regulatory power. The Court in Silver recognized this
principle, holding that self-regulatory concerted refusals to deal, when incidental to
a partial repeal of the Sherman Act, were exempted from per se analysis only when
accompanied by procedural safeguards. 27 Requiring procedural protection is an
effective way to ensure a good faith use of the potentially anticompetitive powers
conferred by a mandate for industry self-regulation.2 8 Furthermore, the procedural
safeguards will not restrict the potentially procompetitive effects that inspired the
courts or Congress to recognize a partial exemption from the Sherman Act for
self-regulation. 29
I. GROUP Boycorr ANALYSIS AND MANDATES FOR SELF-REGULATION
A. The Dual Standard of Antitrust Analysis
The Sherman Act3o was passed in 1890 to promote full and fair competition in
the interstate and overseas commerce of the United States.3' Various analysts have
characterized the Act as a natural outgrowth of common law concerns with restraint
of trade, 32 as a political response to the Populist and other agrarian political forces of
the late nineteenth century, 33 as an effort to protect small business interests from
rampant cartelization and monopolization, 34 and as an attempt to maximize consumer
welfare.3 5 Yet, whatever temporal conceptions Congress may have entertained as an
immediate inspiration for the Sherman Act, the Act was given a broad, conceptual
wording.3 6 Its language has allowed courts and subsequent legislators to mold an
operative substantive paradigm to protect competitive activity in the ever-evolving
25. See infra notes 185-86 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 185-220 and accompanying text.
27. Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 364-65 (1963).
28. For a discussion of the benefits of process that were envisioned by the Court in Silver, see id. at 361-63.
29. See id.
30. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982).
31. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958). See also Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light
Co., 435 U.S. 389, 398 (1978); I E. Kunam, FDERAL ANsnRusT LAw (1980) (especially note 574 and accompanying text).
32. See, e.g., Stigler, The Origin of the Sherman Act, 14 J. LoAL SsuD. 1 (1985).
33. See, e.g., H. ThoiREn, THE FEats. Asrnsr Poucy: THE ORGAsZATnIoN oF AN AsrucAN TRrADmos 58-60 (1955).
34. See, e.g., W. BAX'r, Tim PosncAL. EcoNomer oF ANrrriusr (Robert D. Tollison ed. 1980).
35. See, e.g., Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J. LAw MD EcoN. 7 (1966).
36. See Apex Hosiery Co. v. Lader, 310 U.S. 469, 489 (1940) ("The prohibitions of the Sherman Act were not
stated in terms of precision or of crystal clarity and the Act itself did not define them. In consequence of the vagueness
of the language, .. . the courts have been left to give content to the statute .... "); Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United
States, 288 U.S. 344, 359-60 (1933) ("Mhe Act has a generality and adaptability comparable to that found ... in
constitutional provisions. It does not go into detailed definitions which might either work injury to legitimate enterprise
or through particularization defeat its purposes by providing loopholes for escape.") See generally H. Hovm4cA, supra
note 4, at § 2.4.
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marketplace. 37 Consequently, the Sherman Act retains its vitality and effectiveness
today, almost a century after its enactment. 38
Section One of the Sherman Act39 prohibits contracts, combinations, and
conspiracies in restraint of trade, while Section Two prohibits monopolization and
attempts or conspiracies to monopolize. 4o The Act introduced a single federal
antitrust paradigm, providing for both civil and criminal liability,4' while previously
only the various and occasionally inconsistent state laws had existed. 42 The Sherman
Act, however, left to the federal courts the task of developing a specific framework
for evaluating claims of violations, 43 and the courts have dutifully fashioned an
operative system for the review of such claims.44
Vigorous enforcement of the Sherman Act was not immediate;45 yet, amid a
growing willingness in the federal courts of the early 1900s to enforce the Sherman
Act,46 "reasonability" was established as the standard of review in Section One
cases. 47 Although this standard has its roots in the common law of trade restraints, 48
its interpretation has not been restricted to pre-existing common law principles of
restraint of trade. 49 Instead, the courts have used the Congressional desire for full and
fair competition as the standard in evaluating reasonableness. 50 The basic standard of
reasonability has been supplemented with a second, special type of analysis involving
activities that are presumptively unreasonable. 5 1 While most activities continue to
37. See supra note 36. See also Sunny Hill Farms Dairy Co. v. Kraftco Corp., 381 F. Supp. 845, 853 (E.D. Mo.
1974) ("The drafters of the Sherman Act . ..could not have anticipated the modem American business complexities nor
could they have foretold the plethora of ingenious methods.. . to avoid Section 1 of the Act. For this reason, the Act
must be liberally construed and applied for the proper enforcement of its dictates.").
38. See H. Hovesmw,', supra note 4, at § 2.4.
39. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
40. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982).
41. Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982).
42. I E. Krrim, supra note 31, at § 4.18.
43. See, e.g., Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918). In this early case, the Court explained that
an assessment of an antitrust claim required more than just a determination that the act complained of restrained trade.
The Court set out the "true test of legality" for the case and a list of the relevant facts in such a test. Id. at 238. See also
remarks of Senator Sherman on March 21, 1890, 21 CoNo. Rac. 2460 (1890), admitting the difficulty of distinguishing
in precise terms the distinction between procompetitive and anticompetitive combinations and adding that:
This must be left for the courts to determine in each particular case. All that we, as lawmakers, can do is to
declare general principles, and we can be assured that the courts will apply them so as to carry out the meaning
of the law, as the courts of England and the United States have done for centuries.
Id. See generally E. Kmrrim, supra note 31; H. Hovu, amov, supra note 4.
44. See infra notes 45-70 and accompanying text.
45. See H. THoREU, supra note 33, at 560-63.
46. See id.
47. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911). See also M. HasmLE, ANrrr Nes Pan'cnvm THE
Co~.ia, m-arY RoL.Es oF RuLs Am DiscanoN 3-28 (1957).
48. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 50-51 (1911) (wherein the Court, interpreting the terms of
the Sherman Act, found it "certain that those terms, at least in their rudimentary meaning, took their origin in the common
law, and were also familiar in the law of this country prior to and at the time of the adoption of the [Sherman Act]").
See also I E. KiemER, supra note 31, at § 4.18; H. Hovauw.an, supra note 4 at § 2.4.
49. See I E. Kmmee, supra note 31, at § 4.18. The Court has consistently noted that the standards "imposed by
the Sherman Act are not mechanical or artificial" and that "each case demands a close scrutiny of its own facts." Sugar
Inst., Inc. v. United States, 297 U.S. 553, 597, 600 (1936). See Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S.
563 (1925); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
50. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
51. When the courts encounter such activities, assertions of the reasonableness of the particular activity are
immaterial because of the pernicious effect the activity has on competition in and of itself. See, e.g., Northern Pac. Ry.
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involve an assessment of reasonableness, judicial experience with certain types of
activity has found them so inherently violative of the antitrust laws that they are
invalid without further inquiry.52 Among those activities held to warrant per se
invalidation are price-fixing,5 3 tying-arrangements, 54 market-splitting agreements, 55
and group boycotts.56
B. Group Boycott Analysis: Struggling with the Per Se Rule
The federal courts, in applying the per se standard to group boycott cases, have
failed to develop a precise standard for finding group activities violative of the
Sherman Act. 57 By definitional minimum, a group boycott involves an agreement,
combination, or conspiracy among two or more parties to disadvantage a third
party.58 Yet not all definitional "group boycotts" have been treated as per se
violations of the Sherman Act.5 9 Recent decisions suggest that group boycotts are
now analyzed under a hybrid of the rule of reason and per se standards. 60
Early cases applied an analysis implicitly similar to the per se rule, 61 yet the
applicability of the per se approach in group boycott cases did not fully mature until
the Supreme Court's decision in Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway Hale Stores, Inc.62 In
Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1958) (asserted harmlessness of tying arrangement not persuasive); Fashion
Originators' Guild, Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 467-68 (1941) (reasonableness of group boycott methods immaterial).
52. These activities are made subject to the per se approach when "judicial experience has shown that the class of
arrangement under scrutiny is very harmful to competition." W. AsrmsoN mAN C. RoGERs, AmrmusT LAw: Poucy AN
PRNcncE 342-43 (1985) (emphasis in original). Particular arrangements within these classes, when brought before the
courts, will be held illegal without inquiry into the particular circumstances. Id. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
See also United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 607-08 (1972) ("It is only after considerable experience
with certain business relationships that courts classify them as per se violations of the Sherman Act.") (emphasis in
original).
53. See White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310
U.S. 150 (1940).
54. See Fortner Enters., Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495 (1969); Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United
States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
55. See United States v. Topo Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972); Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States,
341 U.S. 593 (1951).
56. See United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966); Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc.,
359 U.S. 207 (1959).
57. L. SmnnvAN, LAw oF Amrmusr 229-30 (1977); Bauer, Per Se Illegality of Concerted Refusals to Deal: A Rule
Ripe for Reexamination, 79 Cottm. L. Ray. 685, 685-86 (1979); McCormick, Group Boycotts-Per Se or Not Per Se,
That is the Question, 7 SmoN HAm L. REv. 703, 765 (1976).
58. See H. Hovaxa-.N&, supra note 4, at § 10.1. A group boycott typically involves action by a group of traders in
an effort to interfere with other traders in competition with the group. The effects are typically horizontal, yet a vertical
element is also common. W. Am .soN AND C. Rooms, supra note 52, at § 4.06. For example, in Northwest Wholesale,
the plaintiff could have asserted that the defendant-a combination of competing traders-was attempting to terminate its
wholesale operations by effectively putting the plaintiff at a competitive disadvantage in purchasing wholesale supplies
from the cooperative. As such, the effects of the boycott would ultimately be felt horizontally in the plaintiff's ability to
compete, while the boycott itself involved an effort to use the vertical leverage of the cooperative to affect the plaintiff's
business.
59. I E. Kmrxm, supra note 31, at §§ 10.31-.38. See also infra note 67 and accompanying text.
60. See infra notes 157-84 and accompanying text.
61. See, e.g., Fashion Originators' Guild, Inc. v. FrC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941) (refusing to consider the reasonability
of defendant's motives or purposes); Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers' Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600
(1914) (nature of group boycotts put case in the class of undue and unreasonable restraints).
62. 359 U.S. 207 (1959). In Klor's, the competitors of a department store owner and the manufacturers and
distributors of electric appliances allegedly conspired against the department store owner by refusing to deal at all or
refusing to deal on equal terms. Id. at 209. The group actors sought dismissal of the complaint on the grounds that the
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Klor's, the Court found that a concerted refusal to deal was illegal by its nature,
despite assertions by the group that the anticompetitive effect was minimal. 63
Thereafter, a group boycott-when identified as such-was subject to invalidation
per se.
Until recently, this somewhat inflexible approach to group boycotts was
sustained by the Supreme Court. 64 Because it was perceived as overly restrictive, the
per se rule against group boycotts generated dissatisfaction in the lower courts65 and
criticism from legal commentators. 66 Indeed, the lower courts developed a number of
rationales to prevent the classification of various activities as group boycotts, thereby
protecting them from per se invalidation. 67 Recently, the Court's position has begun
to accomodate the concerns advanced in these commentaries and lower court
decisions. 68 Before classifying an activity as a group boycott warranting per se
effects of the boycott were slight or nonexistent and that the prices, quantity, and quality were unaffected. Id. at 209-10.
The Court rejected this justification, saying:
The Court recognized [in a previous case] that there were some agreements whose validity depended on the
surrounding circumstances. It emphasized, however, that there were classes of restraints which from their
'nature or character' were unduly restrictive ....
Group boycotts, or concerted refusals by traders to deal with other traders, have long been held to be in the
forbidden category.
Id. at 211-12. While previous decisions had described group boycotts in terms of the per se rule, certain doubts and
ambiguities remained. For a good discussion, see McCormick, supra note 57, at 725-26 & n.112. The Klor's decision
cleared up doubts as to the Court's position. Id. at 726-27. See II E. Kntnam, supra note 31, at § 10.30.
63. See supra note 62.
64. See, e.g., Federal Maritime Comm'n v. Aktiebolaget Svenska Amerika Linien, 390 U.S. 238, 250 (1968);
United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127, 145, 146 (1966); Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light &
Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656, 659-60 (1961) (per curiam). See also Bauer, supra note 57, at 686-92.
65. The dissatisfaction of the lower courts with the per se rule in the group boycott context is evident in the
numerous decisions refusing to invalidate activities that are, by all appearances, group boycotts. See infra note 59.
66. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 31. See also Comment, A Reexamination of the Boycott Per Se Rule in
Antitrust Law, 48 TEas. L.Q. 126 (1974).
67. The discomfort of the lower courts is made evident by their frequent willingness to prevent reasonable,
concerted activity from being declared per se illegal. As one court has warned, "['ro outlaw certain types of business
conduct merely by attaching the 'group boycott' and 'per se' labels obviously invites the chance that certain types of
reasonable concerted activity will be proscribed." Worthen Bank & Trust Co. v. National BankAmericard, Inc., 485 F.2d
119, 125 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 918 (1974). Among the decisions refusing to declare a group boycott
per se illegal are: United States v. Realty Multi-List, Inc., 629 F.2d 1351, 1367-68 (5th Cir. 1980) (though group boycott
was present in exclusion of real estate brokers from multiple listing service, per se rule was inapplicable where group
boycott was reasonable respouse to "pervasive market imperfections"); Phil Tolkan Datsun, Inc. v. Greater Milwaukee
Datsun Dealers' Advertising Ass'n, Inc., 672 F.2d 1280, 1285-86 (7th Cir. 1982) (though group boycott occurred when
dealer was excluded from cooperative membership, per se rule was inapplicable in context of trade association
membership where necessity to effective competition not demonstrated).
A more comprehensive analysis of this subject is beyond the scope of this Comment, but may be found in I E.
KmntraR, supra note 31, at §§ 10.31-38 (1980), and McCormick, supra note 57, at 737-64.
68. See Brunet, Streamlining Antitrust Litigation by 'Facial Examination' of Restraints: The Burger Court and the
Per Se -Rule of Reason Distinction, 60 WASH. L. Rav. 1, 27 (1984) (asserting that the Burger Court has blurred the
distinction between per se and rule of reason standards by adding elements of the rule of reason approach in a preliminary
"facial examination" in per se cases); see infra notes 66-67 and accompanying text. See also Rothery Storage & Van Co.
v. Atias Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210, 216 (D.C. Cir. 1986) ("The Supreme Court has now made explicit what had
always been understood . . . . Mhe per se illegality of all boycotts has now been squarely rejected."); Phil Tolkaa
Datsun, Inc. v. Greater Milwaukee Datsun Dealers' Advertising Ass'n, Inc., 672 F.2d 1280, 1284 (7th Cir. 1982) ("In
its more recent antitrust decisions, the Supreme Court has cautioned against overzealous application of the per se
doctrine.").
A few of the Court's recent decisions illustrate this recent trend. In St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Barry, 438
U.S. 531 (1978), four malpractice insurance companies were sued for a concerted refusal to deal. St. Paul Fire, in order
to reduce the coverage offered to physicians, induced its competitors to refuse to deal with St. Paul's policyholders. The
principle question before the Court was whether the alleged boycott was a "boycott" under the MeCarran-Ferguson Act,
15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-15 (1982). This Act permits the states to regulate the insurance business free of the Sherman Act.
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analysis, many federal courts, including the Supreme Court, conduct facial analyses
of the underlying intent and surrounding circumstances of a group boycott.69 As a
result, per se invalidation of a group boycott now requires a preliminary confirmation
of a likelihood of predominantly anticompetitive consequences.
70
C. Exceptions to the Per Se Rule: Partial Repeals and Self-Regulatory Mandates
Even if an activity would normally constitute a per se violation of the Sherman
Act, Congress and the federal courts have been willing to create exceptions to the
regular standards of antitrust analysis when they have perceived the exception likely
to enhance competition or effectuate some related policy.71 These exceptions-or
partial repeals-may be express or implied by statute, 72 or they may be recognized by
the courts as inherently consistent with antitrust policy. 73 Creation of an exception to
However, the Sherman Act still applies in cases of agreements to boycott, coerce, or intimidate. 15 U.S.C. § 1013 (b)
(1982). After determining that Congress used the term "boycott" with its "tradition of meaning, as elaborated in the body
of decisions interpreting the Sherman Act," the Court made the statement: "[Tjhe issue before us is whether the conduct
in question involves a boycott, not whether it is per se unreasonable." St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Barry, 438
U.S. 531,541-42 (1978). Although the Court ultimately decided that the boycott was illegal, the scope of the per s rule
against boycotts had clearly been questioned. Id. at 544-45.
In NCAA v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984), the Court found an exclusive football
telecasting plan violative of the Sherman Act under the rule of reason. Significantly, the Court declined to apply the per
se rule, as the Circuit Court had done, and did not even consider the group boycott doctrine, as the District Court had
done. See id. at 97 & n.13. After deciding the case under the rule of reason, the Court asserted that both standards involve
the same "ultimate focus." Id. at 103. In a footnote, the Court made the statement: "Indeed, there is often no bright line
separating per s from Rule of Reason analysis. Per s rules may require considerable inquiry into market conditions
before the evidence justifies a presumption of anticompetitive conduct." Id. at 104 n.26. The implication is clear that the
per s rule may not always be applicable without further inquiry. Rigid, doctrinal application of the per se standard is to
be avoided.
Still another example of the Court's current pragmatic approach to the per s rules is Northwest Wholesale itself. See
infra notes 130-51 and accompanying text.
69. See, e.g., MacHovec v. Council for the Nat'l Register of Health Serv. Providers in Psychology, Inc., 616 F.
Supp. 258, 269-72 (E.D. Va. 1985). See Brunet, supra note 68, at 27.
70. See, e.g., Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co., 105 S. Ct. 2613, 2620
(1985) (those boycotts that are per s forbidden exhibit a "likelihood of predominantly anticompetitive consequences").
71. The court-fashioned exemptions have taken various forms and rationales. See, e.g., Eastern R.R. Presidents
Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127,135 (1961) ("no violation of the [Sherman] Act can be predicated
on mere attempts to influence the passage or enforcement of laws"); Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350-51 (1943)
("nothing in the language of the Sherman Act... suggests that its purpose was to restrain a state or its officers or agents
from activities directed by its legislature"); Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. National League of Professional
Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200, 209 (1922) (organized baseball not subject to Sherman Act because it has no effect on
interstate commerce).
Congress has also expressly fashioned exemptions and immunities in various ways and means. For example, the
Clayton Act made antitrust laws inapplicable to labor organizations. 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1982). The "business of insurance,"
except for acts of boycott, coercion, or intimidation, was exempted from the antitrust laws to the extent that state
regulation was involved. MeCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-15 (1982). A limited antitrust exemption is also
provided for agricultural cooperatives to organize, exchange data, and fix prices. See the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 17
(1982); the Capper-Volstead Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 291-92 (1982). See generally Ell H. Touu[s, A TREAssu ON nm Arm'rUsr
Lws oF nm UrrEm STArms (1949).
72. Congressional legislation can repeal portions of Sherman Act analysis expressly, if the language of the statute
makes the partial repeal clear, or implicitly, if the statutory purpose requires some repeal power over regularly applicable
principles. An example of an express partial repeal is Section Four of the Robinson-Patman Act, which expressly exempts
cooperative profit distributions from its prohibitions against price discrimination. 15 U.S.C. § 13b (1982). An example
of an implied repeal is the mandate in the Securities Exchange Act for exchange self-policing. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78f(b), 78f(d)
(1982). These provisions were interpreted in Silver as justifying activities that might otherwise have violated the Sherman
Act. This partial repeal was recognized despite the fact that "no express exemption from the antitrust laws" was found
in the statute. Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 357, 360-61 (1963).
73. The characteristics of a particular market or industry structure may lead the Court to recognize an immunity to
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the Sherman Act, however, will always be motivated by the competitive needs of the
particular industry or of the business organization in the context of its particular
market.
Congress, for example, has made numerous efforts to enhance the effectiveness
of antitrust policy since the Sherman Act was enacted. 74 Many federal statutes deal
with particular markets75 or concerns, 76 and many create exemptions from the broad
antitrust principles that they codify or that the Sherman Act embraces. 77 While the
exemption usually will be explicit, a statute will occasionally contradict the antitrust
laws without expressly repealing them. 78 These exceptions have been treated by the
federal courts as implied partial repeals of the Sherman Act.79 Courts typically
interpret this repeal power narrowly when confronted with a conflict with the
Sherman Act, in light of the implicit rather than explicit nature of the repeal.80
Indeed, whether the exception is statutory or court-recognized, some measure of rule
of reason analysis will most likely still be appropriate. 81
some antitrust rules. For example, the Court has held that the mere attempt to influence passage of legislation or
enforcement of laws cannot give rise to an antitrust claim. See Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor
Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 135 (1961).
74. Since the enactment of the Sherman Act in 1890, several specific concerns have necessitated legislative
treatment. A complete discussion of these is unnecessary for purposes of this Comment. Instead, a few examples will
serve to illustrate Congress' continued role in the development of antitrust policy. One such example is the Clayton Act,
which was enacted in 1914 in an effort to treat certain practices at their inception-rather than consummation-if they
were substantially likely to create an anticompetitive effect. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 12, 13, 14-19, 20, 21, 22-27, 44 (1982);
F. JoNEs, TE.AsE A socremN Acivrmnrs AN TH LAw 8 (1922). The Clayton Act was less amorphous than the Sherman Act,
expressly dealing with mergers, exclusive-dealing arrangements, interlocking directorships, and other specific concerns.
See II H. Touum.e, A TnsT.isn oN nm Armrmsr LAws oF mm UNrrn STAES § 1.6 (1949).
The Federal Trade Commission Act is another example of a post-Sherman Act supplement to the antitrust laws. See
7 U.S.C. § 610, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1982). This Act granted the Federal Trade Commission broad powers to declare
trade practices unfair. FrC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316, 320-21 & n.3 (1966). Still another example is the
Robinson-Patman Act of 1936, which revised and supplemented prior law on the subject of price discrimination. See 15
U.S.C. §§ 13-13b, 21a (1982).
75. See, e.g., McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-15 (1982), which deals solely with antitrust principles
in the insurance business.
76. See, e.g., Robinson-Patman Price Discrimination Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 13-13b, 21a (1982), which deals with
price discrimination without regard to any one industry or market.
77. See supra note 71.
78. See infra notes 79-81 and accompanying text. In Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, the Court, in discussing
a conflict between the Securities Exchange Act and the antitrust laws, said: "The Securities Exchange Act contains no
express exemption from the antitrust laws .... This means that any repealer of the antitrust laws must be discerned as
a matter of implication." 373 U.S. 341, 357 (1963). The Court was willing to imply such exemptions, but only to the
extent necessary to effectuate the purposes of the Securities Exchange Act. Id. But see United States v. Borden Co., 308
U.S. 188, 201 (1939) (the Court refused to imply immunity beyond that which had been expressly granted in the
Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act).
79. See, e.g., Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 357 (1963).
80. Id.; see also Califomia v. Federal Power Comm'n, 369 U.S. 482, 485 (1962) ("Immunity from the antitrust
laws is not lightly implied."); Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 324 U.S. 439, 456-57 (1945) ("[lt is elementary that
repeals by implication are not favored. Only a clear repugnancy between the old law and the new results in the former
giving way and then only pro tanto to the extent of the repugnancy."); United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188, 198
(1939) ("It is a cardinal principle of construction that repeals by implication are not favored.").
81. When the federal courts confront a partial repeal of the Sherman Act, they still must consider those antitrust
principles that have not been ousted. In Silver, for example, the Court attempted to reconcile the Sherman Act with the
Securities Exchange Act in order to discern the degree to which the Sherman Act had been repealed. 373 U.S. 341,357
(1963).
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1. Self-Regulatory Mandates and Group Boycotts
In the context of the per se rule against group boycotts, one type of partial repeal
that has been recognized is a mandate for industry self-regulation.8 2 Certain industries
and business organizations are necessarily allowed to create and enforce reasonable
rules of self-government in order to fully benefit the competitive process.83 These
regulatory activities may have all of the characteristics of an illicit group boycott that
would normally be invalid per se, yet the nature of the industry will necessitate the
more flexible analysis of the rule of reason.8 Mandates for self-regulation can be
embodied in statutes85 or simply recognized by the courts as inherently consistent
with fuli and fair competition.8 6
The Court was confronted with this type of repeal in Silver v. New York Stock
Exchange.8 7 In Silver, an over-the-counter dealer in municipal bonds asserted that the
New York Stock Exchange had violated Sections One and Two of the Sherman Act
by terminating his private wire connections with Exchange members without providing
him with procedural safeguards.88 The wire connections, an important service in the
securities market,89 were subject to the regulation and control of the various exchanges
by the Securities Exchange Act.90 The bylaws created by the Exchange pursuant to
the Securities Exchange Act did not provide procedural protections for the governed
members, 91 and the plaintiff in Silver was disconnected without prior notice or a
hearing.9
The Court in Silver first determined that the activity would, absent other federal
regulation, 93 constitute a group boycott in restraint of trade. 94 Thus, the activity would
have been a per se violation of the Sherman Act.95 However, the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 granted the Exchange certain self-regulatory powers, 96 including the right
to govern relations between members and non-members.97 Nothing in the Securities
Exchange Act, however, entirely excluded the Exchange's activities from the scope
82. See, e.g., Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
83. See id.; Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co., 105 S. Ct. 2613, 2620
(1985) ("Wholesale purchasing cooperatives must establish and enforce reasonable rules in order to function
effectively.").
84. As the Court noted in Silver, "[Under the aegis of the rule of reason, traditional antitrust concepts are flexible
enough to permit the Exchange sufficient breathing space within which to carry out the mandate of the Securities
Exchange Act." 373 U.S. 341, 360 (1963).
85. See supra note 71.
86. Id.
87. 373 U.S. 341, 357 (1963).
88. Id. at 345.
89. Id. at 348.
90. Id. at 352. See Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b-77e, 77j, 77k, 77m, 77o, 77s, 78a et seq. (1982).
91. 373 U.S. 341, 355 n.ll (1963).
92. Id. at 344.
93. In this case, the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78f. See supra notes 71-81 and accompanying text.
94. 373 U.S. 341, 347 (1963).
95. The Court noted, "It is plain ... that the removal of the wires by collective action of the Exchange and its
members would, had it occurred in a context free from other federal regulation, constitute a per se violation of § I of the
Sherman Act." Id. at 347 (emphasis added).
96. See Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b), (d) (1982).
97. Id.
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of the antitrust laws,98 and the Court determined that the grant of self-regulatory power
in the Securities Exchange Act should not be interpreted as repealing the Sherman Act
beyond the extent necessary to accomplish the legislative goals of the provision. 99
Therefore, although per se invalidation of the group boycott was inappropriate, an
assessment of reasonability under the Sherman Act was nonetheless required. Even
if the Exchange operated pursuant to its mandate for self-regulation, unreasonable
activities to the detriment of full and fair competition would be illegal under the
Sherman Act.
2. Self-Regulatory Mandates and the Reasonability of Process
Next, the Court in Silver found that the grant of self-regulatory power in the
Securities Exchange Act did not justify the Exchange's refusal to grant a hearing and
explanation to the plaintiff. 1' ° Indeed, the Securities Exchange Act's underlying
concerns with fair dealing and the protection of securities investors' 01 were
compromised by the denial of process. 102 By imposing a requirement of procedural
fairness, the Court intended to prevent violations of the antitrust laws by actors who
deviate from the legislative or other purpose underlying an authorization of
self-regulatory power.10 3 Hence, although the self-regulatory boycott in Silver was
not invalidated under the per se rule, the denial of procedural protections was
unreasonable.
The Silver decision implies that when, for example, a federal statute specifically
or implicitly allows an activity that might otherwise constitute a violation of the
antitrust laws, the activity is tolerable to the extent necessary to effectuate the
underlying legislative purpose."14 However, a statute that permits a group to exercise
self-regulatory power-with the aim of benefiting the competitive process-does not
sanction an arbitrary or unfair use of those powers in derogation of full and fair
competition.105 In group boycott cases, the procedural requirement is intended to
guarantee that a mandated power of regulatory activity is not used arbitrarily and to
provide a basis for judicial review. 06 Under Silver, self-regulatory activity that
would normally constitute a group boycott warranting per se invalidation might
survive Sherman Act analysis when three conditions are met. 10 7 First, there must be
98. The Court noted, "[lit does not follow that . . . since the Exchange has a general power to adopt rules
governing its members' relations with nonmembers, particular applications of such rules are therefore outside the purview
of the antitrust laws." 373 U.S. 341, 357 (1963).
99. Id.
100. Id. at 361.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 361-63.
103. Id. at 364-65. See also Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Management, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1049, 1065 (C.D. Cal.
1971).
104. See Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 357 (1963).
105. See id. at 364.
106. Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Management, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1049, 1065 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
107. Id. at 1064-65.
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a mandate, legislative or otherwise, 08 for industry self-regulation. 0 9 Second, the
collective activity must be reasonably designed to accomplish an end consistent with
the policy motivating the mandate. 110 Third, procedural safeguards must be pro-
vided."'
II. Northwest Wholesale
A. The Expulsion of Pacific Stationery from the Trade Association
In Northwest Wholesale,112 the courts were confronted with a retailer's
expulsion, unaccompanied by procedural safeguards, from a non-profit trade asso-
ciation. 13 Northwest Wholesale, a wholesale purchasing cooperative composed of
office supply retailers in the Pacific Northwest, sells its supplies to both member and
non-member retailers.114 At the end of each year, Northwest Wholesale distributes its
profits to its members, resulting in a significantly lower cost for members purchasing
from the association." 5 Arguably, this practice is a form of price discrimination,1 16
yet it is specifically authorized by Section Four of the Robinson-Patman Act.' 17
Northwest Wholesale also provides its members with wholesale storage facilities,
giving them certain economies of scale that otherwise would be unavailable. 18
The membership of the cooperative was governed by a set of bylaws, two of
which were especially relevant to the dispute. Since 1974, Northwest Wholesale
prohibited its individual members from engaging simultaneously in both retail and
wholesale operations. 119 Another bylaw obligated members to bring changes in the
ownership of a controlling share of stock to the attention of the membership.' 20
Pacific Stationery, a member of the cooperative since 1958, continued to engage in
both retail and wholesale operations despite the cooperative's disapproval. 12 1 A
grandfather clause secured their right to continue both operations after the enactment
of the bylaw. 122 Pacific Stationery failed, however, to bring a change in stock
108. Id. Language in Silver indicated that the mandate could be legislative or otherwise. Thus, a relevant power of
self-regulation can be one granted expressly or impliedly in a statute, or it can be "inherently required by the market's
structure." Id. at 1064. See also Note, supra note 15, at 1488-97 (discussing the self-regulatory powers of trade
associations, and the sources of these powers, in light of Silver).
109. 325 F. Supp. 1049, 1064-65 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
110. Id. at 1065.
111. Id.
112. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co. v. Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc., 715 F.2d 1393 (9th Cir. 1983),
rev'd, 105 S. Ct. 2613 (1985).
113. Id. at 2616.
114. Id. at 2615.
115. Id.
116. See Pacific Stationery & Printing Co. v. Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc., 715 F.2d 1393, 1395 (9th Cir.
1983) ("In other circumstances, it would be plausible to interpret such a situation as a price discrimination.") See supra
note 4 and accompanying text. The Robinson-Patman Act provides the source of the exemption for cooperative profit
distribution from consideration as price discrimination. See infra note 117 and accompanying text. Cf. In E. Kmsar AN
J. BAuER, FEmmL% Acrnxusr Lw § 19.14 (1983).
117. 15 U.S.C. § 13b (1982).
118. Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co., 105 S. Ct. 2613, 2615 (1985).
119. Id. at 2616.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
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ownership to the official attention of the cooperative, thereby violating the bylaw
governing that subject, and the membership voted to expel Pacific in 1978.123
Pacific Stationery contended that the expulsion was motivated by Pacific's
continued maintenance of wholesale operations, 2 4 while Northwest Wholesale
claimed that its motivation was Pacific's failure to notify the cooperative of the
change in stock ownership. 12 5 The actual motivation for the expulsion is not apparent
from the record, 126 and the nature and scope of the competitive injury to Pacific is
also uncertain.127 Pacific Stationery brought suit in federal district court in Oregon,128
claiming that the expulsion of Pacific constituted a violation of the antitrust laws.129
B. Northwest Wholesale: Applying Antitrust Principles
The United States District Court for the District of Oregon rejected the
applicability of the per se rule, found no basis for an invalidation under the rule of
reason, and granted summary judgment for Northwest Wholesale. 130 On appeal, the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed this decision, 13' holding that the lack of
procedural safeguards prevented Northwest Wholesale from qualifying for "the
narrow rule of reason exception to the usual per se rule against group boycotts."' 32
The United States Supreme Court, in an opinion written by Justice Brennan, reversed
the Circuit Court's decision and remanded the case for a review of the District Court's
rule of reason analysis. 133 In reaching this result, the Court first dismissed the
applicability of the Silver due process requirement 34 and then held that the boycott
of Pacific Stationery did not warrant application of the per se rule. 135 In each
instance, the Court was responding to the inequities of a rigid per se approach to
group boycotts, yet in each case, the Court may have gone too far.
Turning first to the issue of procedural safeguards, the Court was confronted
with its own decision in Silver.136 In Silver, the Court had found an implied partial
repeal of the Sherman Act, insofar as the Sherman Act would limit the self-regulation
of a securities exchange, necessary to effectuate the goals of the Securities Exchange
Act. 37 The policy disfavoring repeals by implication had led the Court to narrow the
permissible self-policing activities to those which both further the goals of the grant
of power and include procedural protection. 3 8 The Robinson-Patman Act, which
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. See also Pacific Stationery & Printing Co. v. Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc., 715 F.2d 1393 (9th Cir.
1983), rev'd, 105 S. Ct. 2613 (1985).
132. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co. v. NorthwestWholesaleStationers, Inc., 715 F.2d 1393,1398 (9thCir. 1983).
133. Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co., 105 S. Ct. 2613, 2621-22 (1985).
134. Id. at 2619.
135. Id. at 2621.
136. Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
137. See supra notes 96-99 and accompanying text.
138. Id.
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grants cooperatives the power to distribute profits and effectively conduct price
discrimination, 139 inherently subjects the use of the power to the self-regulatory
activities of the cooperatives.14 It implicitly insulates self-regulatory control of the
benefits of profit distribution from the normally applicable Sherman Act analysis and,
as such, seems analogous to the Securities Exchange Act in Silver. But the Court
distinguished Silver, holding that the Robinson-Patman Act does not provide the
"broad mandate for industry self-regulation" 1 41 that had been present in Silver.
The Court next addressed the question of whether the decision to expel Pacific
Stationery was a group boycott warranting per se invalidation. 142 Noting the
confusion surrounding the applicability of the per se rule to group boycotts,143 the
Court used care in defining the type of group boycott warranting the per se
rule. 44 The Court noted that the per se approach is typically applied when a group
has disadvantaged a competitor by denying it relationships necessary in the
competitive struggle. 145 The Court noted that boycotts in these cases often involve a
needed market, facility, or supply that is controlled by a group of firms possessing a
dominant position in the relevant market.' 46 Also common is a lack of evidence of
procompetitive effects.147 The Court found that, although all of these indicators need
not be present for a per se invalidation, a likelihood of predominantly anticompetitive
consequences must be established.148
In analyzing the expulsion of Pacific Stationery, the Court found no basis for
implying anticompetitive effects or animus. 149 Furthermore, there had been no
threshhold showing by Pacific that the cooperative possessed the market power
necessary to disadvantage Pacific.' 50 Thus, the Court determined that the rule of
reason approach of the District Court was proper.151
139. See supra notes 115-17 and accompanying text.
140. Id.
141. Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co., 105 S. Ct. 2613, 2619 (1985). The
Court, in a comparison of the Securities Exchange Act and the Robinson-Patman Act, found that the self-policing
provisions of the former were not comparable to the latter's "narrow immunity." Id. at 2618. The Court held that the
Robinson-Palman Act's exemption for cooperative profit distribution "cannot plausibly be construed as an exemption to
or repeal of any portion of the Sherman Act." Id. at 2618-19 (footnote omitted).
Pacific Stationery, however, did not contend that the cooperative's profit distributions required an application of the
per se analysis. Instead, the concerted activity of the cooperative was asserted to be a group boycott. Id. at 2616. Thus,
the Act's authorization of profit distribution is not the source of the alleged violative activity. Rather, the self-regulatory
powers attending the right of a cooperative to distribute profits and govern members were the sources of an alleged group
boycott in restraint of trade.
142. Id. at 2619.
143. Id. In discussing the parameters of the group boycott category, the Court noted, "Exactly what types of activity
fall within the forbidden category is, however, far from certain." Id. The Court, quoting Professor Sullivan, stated that
"[t]here is more confusion about the scope and operation of the per se rule against group boycotts than in reference to
any other aspect of the per se doctrine." Id. (quoting from L. SuruvANr, lAw oF ANnThusT 229-30 (1977)). See supra note
57 and accompanying text.
144. Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co., 105 S. Ct. 2613, 2619 (1985).
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 2620.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 2620-21.
150. Id. at 2621.
151. Id.
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C. Northwest Wholesale: Implications of the Court's Opinion
The Court's treatment of the issues in Northwest Wholesale presents a number
of problems. In terms of form, it is surprising that the procedural safeguards issue was
treated before the group boycott was assessed. The procedural safeguards required by
Silver would be irrelevant unless there was a group boycott which, absent some
mandate of self-regulatory power, would warrant per se invalidation. 5 2 In light of the
subsequent determination that the group boycott at issue was not one warranting
application of the per se rule,153 discussion of the Silver due process rule seems
unnecessary.
In terms of its implications for antitrust analysis, the Court's opinion is even
more disturbing. The Court's harsh rejection of the procedural safeguards require-
ment of Silver severely limits the scope of a rule that is significant in preserving good
faith in the use of potentially anticompetitive self-regulatory power 54 In addition,
the Court's analysis of the group boycott may have unduly distorted the standards for
the evaluation of such boycotts.15 5 Although the Court was justifiably concerned with
avoiding a per se invalidation without some threshold assessment of the likelihood of
anticompetitive consequences, the threshold analysis employed by the Court may
have undercut the value of the per se rule's use in group boycott cases.15 6 This
Comment will first suggest a more appropriate adaptation of the per se approach to
group boycotts and will then discuss an appropriate role for procedures in mandated
self-regulatory activities.
HLI. ADAPTNG THE PER SE RULE TO GROUP BoycoTr ANALYSIS
A. The Goals of the Reformation
The courts have determined that the group boycott is generally a type of activity
which is so inherently anticompetitive that a presumption of invalidity is justified.15 7
Thus, group boycotts have been deemed per se invalid and have received the harsh
treatment of per se analysis since several early decisions. 5 8 Some group exclusionary
activities, however, can enhance competition significantly. 159 If merely bearing the
label "group boycott" is allowed to determine legality, otherwise procompetitive
152. See Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Management, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1049, 1064-65 (C.D. Cal. 1971). See also
Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
153. Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co., 105 S. Ct. 2613, 2621 (1985).
154. See infra notes 185-220 and accompanying text.
155. See infra notes 157-84 and accompanying text.
156. The Court's concern with misapplication of per se rules is reflected in its requirement of a "satisfactory
threshold determination whether anticompetitive effects would be likely." 105 S. Ct. 2613, 2621 (1985). Reversing the
Circuit Court's approach, the Court asserted, "It does not denigrate the per se approach to suggest care in application."
Id. at 2621-22 (emphasis added).
157. See supra notes 52, 56 and accompanying text.
158. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
159. See, e.g., Bauer, supra note 57. Professor Bauer identifies three situations that will justify a group boycott in
an industry: (I) a need in the industry for the elimination of some competition, (2) societal benefits of a group boycott
outweighing competitive injuries of a group boycott, and (3) a group boycott that is neutral in its effect. Id. at 699.
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activities could be suppressed under the Sherman Act. This unfortunate result
obviously would be inconsistent with federal antitrust policy.
Concern with the overbreadth of a strict per se approach is leading the federal
courts to adopt a more flexible approach with respect to group boycotts. '60 Today, not
only must a group activity constitute a group boycott, but it must also involve a
"likelihood of predominantly anticompetitive consequences"' 16 1 in order to be
subjected to the per se standard.' 62 In determining whether a group boycott is one
warranting application of the per se rule, a preliminary analysis of the activity is
required.163
A benefit of a required facial analysis is that it allows preservation of many of
the benefits of the per se rule. Furthermore, it may return to group boycott analysis
some of the flexibility needed to effectively serve antitrust policy. 164 The per se rule,
though criticized as occasionally "paint[ing] with a broad brush'165 to bring
about an anticompetitive result, provides the significant advantages of providing
industry with a clear standard and allowing courts to avoid extensive inquiries into the
intents and effects of commercial activity. 166 The rule of reason, by contrast, presents
certain disadvantages that the per se approach successfully avoids. For example,
while the rule of reason allows a court to evaluate the evils and benefits of a certain
activity on a case-by-case basis, 167 thus minimizing the risk of prohibiting a
procompetitive activity, courts have been justifiably hesitant to "ramble through the
wilds of economic theory"' 168 to evaluate reasonability. Rule of reason analysis
carries with it the specter of complex, costly, and extensive litigation,1 69 as well as
uncertainty as to result.170 Thus, while the scope of the per se rule may have been
160. See supra notes 67-70 and accompanying text.
161. Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co., 105 S. Ct. 2613, 2620 (1985).
162. Id. at 2620-21.
163. Id. The Court, in denying applicability of the per se rule, noted that at no time had Pacific made a "threshold
showing" of the likelihood of anticompetitive consequences. Id. at 2621. See Goss v. Memorial Hosp. Sys., 789 F.2d
353, 355-56 (5th Cir. 1986)(affirming a district court's conduct of such a threshold analysis.). See also NCAA v. Board
of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 104 n.26 (1984) ("Per se rules may require considerable inquiry into
market conditions before the evidence justifies a presumption of anticompetitive conduct.").
164. See Bauer, supra note 57. Professor Bauer asserts that modification of the rigid application of the per se rule
to all group boycotts is necessary. Under this theory, by assessing the group's intent and the likelihood of anticompetitive
effects before applying the rule, the Court could prevent misapplication of the per se rule by allowing courts to use the
rule of reason standard where the per se approach is not justified.
165. See supra notes 57-63 and accompanying text.
166. See infra notes 167-68. See also F. Scmrsn, IausmnuA MARcr STrucrtmE AD EcoNosec Paowmcs 438-43
(1970).
167. See generally H E. KunoRo, supra note 31, at § 8.2.
168. United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 609 n.10 (1972).
169. See Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 343 (1982) ("The elaborate inquiry into the
reasonableness of a challenged business practice entails significant costs."). That antitrust litigation can be complex and
costly is fairly well recognized. As one author writes, "understanding the antitrust implications of commercial facts,
managing the necessary discovery and marshalling the enormous quantity of evidence for use in antitrust trials are very
substantial undertakings for the neophyte lawyer." C. Hia.s, ANrmsr AnvusR 652-53 (3d ed. 1971). See generally J.
Gam*mm Ann M. MAuNA, Arnnusr LmuaAoN (1985).
170. See United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 609 n.10 (1972) ("Without the per se rules,
businessmen would be left with little to aid them in predicting in any particular case what courts will find to be legal and
illegal under the Sherman Act.") (emphasis added). One author notes:
One of the major frustrations of business persons and their lawyers (and no doubt judges as well) is what might
be termed the uncertainty factor in antitrust law. Particularly in the gray areas where conflicting policies overlap,
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overly broad in some past applications, 17 1 efforts to restructure group boycott analysis
should be careful not to displace the rule unnecessarily.
Assuming that a reformation of the per se approach to group boycotts is
appropriate, the reform should be careful to preserve the benefits of the per se rule
when they outweigh the disadvantages. Admittedly, some alleged group boycotts
may involve an absence of anticompetitive intent or effects, warranting the increased
pragmaticism that has characterized some recent cases. A preliminary inquiry into the
likelihood of predominantly anticompetitive consequences can be used to segregate
those group boycotts that are the exceptions to the norm. But this inquiry should not
be too rigorous. In general, group boycotts have been found to have a pernicious
effect so often as to warrant a presumption of invalidity.177
B. The Current State of the Reformation
Unfortunately, the analyses of group boycotts found in recent court decisions
employ no such presumption of invalidity. Instead, they require that a preliminary
demonstration by the plaintiff confirm the likelihood of anticompetitive conse-
quences. 73 By placing this burden on the plaintiff, this approach attenuates the
underlying philosophy of per se analysis. Group boycotts have been subjected to per
se invalidation because of the overwhelming likelihood of anticompetitive conse-
quences. 174 In assessing the applicability of the per se rule to a group boycott, a court
should presume anticompetitive consequences. In conducting a facial examination of
the group boycott, the court should scrutinize the defendant's efforts to rebut this
presumption instead of assessing the strength of the arguments of the boycotted party
that confirm the presumption.
In Northwest Wholesale, for example, the Court looked for a showing by the
plaintiff that the group boycott would have anticompetitive results. 175 In doing so, it
undercut a presumption necessary to the effective operation of the per se rule. The
Court found that Pacific Stationery had made no threshold showing that the
cooperative had access to "an element essential to effective competition."'176 The
Court found that Pacific's assertions that the expulsion from the cooperative was
motivated by Pacific's refusal to cease wholesale operations were more "appropri-
ately evaluated under the rule of reason analysis."' 17 7 Although noting that
it is at times excedingly difficult to draw clear boundaries between lawful cooperation and unlawful
collaboration, or between lawful competition and unlawful predation.
P. JONES, LrnGA NG PRIvATE ANITrEusT AcnoNs § 1.04 (1984).
171. Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Management, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1049, 1064 (C.D. Cal. 1971) ("[Bly its very
nature the per se approach paints with a very broad brush and eliminates economic cooperation which may be both
necessary and desirable.").
172. See infra notes 175-82 and accompanying text.
173. See, e.g., Goss v. Memorial Hosp. Sys., 789 F.2d 353, 355-56 (5th Cir. 1986); Rickards v. Canine Eye
Registration Found., Inc., 783 F.2d 1329, 1332-33 (9th Cir. 1986); MacHovec v. Council for the Nat'l Register of Health
Serv. Providers in Psychology, Inc., 616 F. Supp. 258, 269-72 (E.D. Va. 1985).
174. United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966).
175. Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co., 105 S. Ct. 2613, 2621 (1985).
176. Id.
177. Id. at 2620 n.7.
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"[s]uch a motive might be more troubling,"' 178 the Court confined its analysis
to the assertion that the stock disclosure bylaw was the reason for the expulsion. 79
The inference is that Pacific's failure to confirm a likelihood of anticompetitive
effects or motives, rather than any showing by Northwest Wholesale to refute a
presumptive likelihood of anticompetitive effects, justified the removal of the group
boycott from the per se rule.180 Yet Pacific Stationery had made plausible assertions
that the expulsion from the cooperative was motivated by questionable intentions,' 8'
and Pacific had lost access to Northwest's wholesale facilities and profit distribu-
tions. 18 2 Thus, anticompetitive motives and effects had been asserted by Pacific
Stationery in the context of this boycott. If a group acts, as they did in this case, to
exclude a competitor from services and benefits, plausible assertions of anticompeti-
tive animus and effects should be accorded more weight.
C. A More Appropriate Alternative
The logical approach to group boycott analysis would be to allow the defendants
to rebut a presumed likelihood of anticompetitive consequences. If the boycotted
party demonstrates the presence of a group boycott and asserts a plausible
anticompetitive effect or motivation for the boycott, a rebuttable presumption of per
se illegality should arise. The group boycott should be held to the per se standard
unless the group can present evidence that refutes this presumptive anticompetitive
character. Under this approach, in assessing a claim that a particular group boycott
violates the Sherman Act, courts would require the group boycotters to overcome a
strong presumption that their boycott violates the Congressional policy of full and fair
competition. However, if the group can refute the presumption and the assertions that
their boycott will have a detrimental effect on the competitive process, the activity
should be evaluated under the rule of reason.
In Northwest Wholesale, the plaintiffs would only have been required to present
a plausible showing of anticompetitive effects or animus. The defendants, asserting
that their boycott should not be held invalid per se, would then have been given the
opportunity-and the burden-to refute the plausibility of the plaintiff's assertions.
If this particular group boycott was one that was capable of enhancing competition,
it could have been removed from the rigid per se rule and analyzed under the more
flexible rule of reason standard. However, if the plaintiffs have a plausible
explanation of the group's activity which involves a violation of the Sherman Act, the
case would not have been removed to the rule of reason merely because the boycotted
plaintiffs were unable to confirm the likelihood of anticompetitive consequences in
their particular case. By modifying the analysis without discarding the underlying
presumptions, the benefits of the per se rule would have been preserved.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 2620.
180. See id. at 2620-21.
181. See supra notes 177-78 and accompanying text.
182. Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co., 105 S. Ct. 2613, 2615 (1985).
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Whether Northwest Wholesale could have met the burden of refuting Pacific
Stationery's assertions is unclear. It is possible that they could not have, and that their
activity should have been found to be a group boycott warranting per se analysis.18 3
But even if the group boycott were determined to be one normally violative of the
Sherman Act, Northwest Wholesale could assert that this activity was insulated from
the normally applicable per se rule because of a mandate for self-regulation. This
mandate could be required by the structure of the industry or embodied in the
Robinson-Patman Act's exemption for cooperative profit distribution.1 4 The due
process requirement of Silver would then become relevant.
IV. THE ROLE OF PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS IN THE ANTITRUST ANALYSIS OF
INDUSTRY SELF-REGULATION
A. Self-Regulatory Mandates and the Need for Due Process
Under Silver, when there is a mandate, legislative or otherwise,185 for industry
self-regulation, collective activity pursuant to the mandate and designed to further the
policy justifying the mandate should be evaluated under the rule of reason if
procedural safeguards are provided. 8 6 The procedural safeguards requirement is
unquestionably an innovation of the courts. 187 Such innovations are nonetheless
justified and, indeed, required by the flexible phrasing of the Sherman Act. 188
Judicial rules that further the policy of full and fair competition are proper substantive
extensions of the Sherman Act. 189
A due process requirement for mandated self-regulatory activity that otherwise
might constitute a group boycott warranting per se invalidation has valuable benefits.
First, notice and a hearing provide an antitrust court with a record, allowing it to
perform its function more effectively. This record will be especially helpful in
conducting a facial examination of the group boycott to determine whether the per se
rule is even applicable. Second, procedural requirements compel group actors to act
in good faith and within their mandate by requiring the presentation of valid reasons
for any potentially anticompetitive activity before the act is done. Third, the
procedural requirement may prevent litigation by requiring extra-judicial interaction
that can disclose the strengths and weaknesses of the parties' respective positions at
an early stage. Fourth, the requirement of a hearing could serve to develop evidence
183. This Comment suggests only that the analytical framework used by the Court in Northwest Wholesale was
faulty. Conceivably, the same result would be reached regardless of the framework selected. For example, Northwest
Wholesale may have been able to rebut a presumed likelihood of anticompetitive effects by showing market characteristies
such as a lack of competitive need for cooperative membership or a lack of cooperative market power. See also Bauer,
supra note 57, at 699-702 (describing three potential justifications for permitting a group boycott).
184. See infra notes 214-20 and accompanying text.
185. See supra notes 107-11 and accompanying text.
186. Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1963); see also Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Management, Inc.,
325 F. Supp. 1049 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
187. See, e.g., Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co., 105 S. Ct. 2613, 2619
(1985) ("Mhe antitrust laws do not themselves impose on joint ventures a requirement of process.").
188. See supra notes 39-44 and accompanying text.
189. Id.
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of an industry practice or custom, while records of past self-regulatory boycotts
would function as evidence of the reasonableness of a present act or asserted
motivation. Fifth, bringing the parties together for a hearing would help prevent a
simple mistake of fact or impression from resulting in potentially harmful self-
regulatory activities by the group.
Balanced against these advantages are relatively few disadvantages. The
safeguards need not be elaborate, expensive, or time-consuming.190 The group actors
would merely want to create a record of their legitimate purposes and attempt to
refute any likelihood of anticompetitive motives or consequences. They would at
least want to establish a reasonable link between their self-regulatory activity and a
policy underlying the grant of self-regulatory power. 9 1 Meanwhile, the prospective
boycotted party would attempt to dissuade the group from taking the planned action
by refuting the justifications advanced by the group. At its conceivably low cost, the
requirement of process serves a valuable role in protecting the competitive process
when self-regulatory power is conferred on an industry.
B. The Treatment of Procedural Safeguards in Northwest Wholesale
In Northwest Wholesale, the plaintiffs argued that the exercise of self-regulatory
power should have been accompanied by such procedural protection. 192 By expelling
Pacific from the trade association, Northwest Wholesale denied Pacific the benefits
of the form of price discrimination permitted by the Robinson-Patman Act. 193 More
importantly, they were acting pursuant to a mandate, inherently required by the
nature of trade associations, to create and enforce reasonable rules. 194 Assuming that
Northwest Wholesale would have asserted an exemption from the per se rule based
on this mandate for self-regulation, the Silver due process requirement should be
applicable. 195
In dismissing the argument for procedural safeguards, 196 the Court relied on two
assertions. 197 First, the Court distinguished the Robinson-Patman Act from the
Securities Exchange Act that had been involved in Silver by noting that the latter had
provided a broad mandate for industry self-regulation. 98 Second, the Court made the
broad statement that:
190. See Note, supra note 15, at 1509. ("In most cases, the requisite procedural mechanism need not be elaborate;
a letter of notice, a standing board of the association, a meeting room, and a stenographer would suffice.").
191. See id. at 1505.
192. Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co., 105 S. Ct. 2613, 2616 (1985).
193. Id.
194. As the Court recognized, "Wholesale purchasing cooperatives must establish and enforce reasonable rules in
order to function effectively." Id. at 2620. This is a recognition by the Court of a mandate for self-regulation necessitated
by characteristics inherent in the nature of trade cooperatives.
195. By exempting cooperatives from its prohibitions against price discrimination, the Robinson-Patman Act
necessarily mandates cooperative self-regulation of profit distribution. This would seem to be the type of legislative
mandate for industry self-regulation "or otherwise" that was confronted in Silver. See Denver Rockets v. All-Pro
Management, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1049, 1064-65 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
196. 105 S. Ct. 2613, 2619 (1985).
197. See infra notes 198-99 and accompanying text.
198. Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co., 105 S. Ct. 2613, 2619 (1985).
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In any event, the absence of procedural safeguards can in no sense determine the antitrust
analysis. If the challenged concerted activity of Northwest's members would amount to a per
se violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, no amount of procedural protection would save
it. If the challenged action would not amount to a violation of Section 1, no lack of
procedural protections would convert it into a per se violation because the antitrust laws do
not themselves impose on joint ventures a requirement of process.199
The Court's premise that the Silver due process rule applies only if tlere is a broad
statutory mandate is questionable for at least two reasons. First, the breadth of a
mandate, along with being difficult to assess, is less important than the effect and
impact it has in practice.2°° Protecting full and fair competition warrants a more
practical evaluation of the source of self-regulatory power. 20 1 The Robinson-Patman
Act, in granting to cooperatives the right to distribute profits, was intended to benefit
small buyers, 202 not to put them at the mercy of trade association regulations.
Cooperatives like Northwest Wholesale protect the interests of small buyers from the
power of huge, mass buyers. 20 3 Implicit in the exemption from the price discrimi-
nation provisions of the Robinson-Patman Act is a mandate to regulate the receipt of
profits2°4 and, hence, a competitive advantage. 20 5 However, it is unlikely that
Congress conferred this power intending to allow for its misuse. 2 6 Regardless of the
breadth of the self-regulatory power, it can be used to accomplish anticompetitive
results that otherwise would be violations of the Sherman Act. If Northwest uses its
power to distribute profits as a weapon to serve anticompetitive motivations or
199. Id. at 2619.
200. The requirement of a broad mandate seems misplaced in light of the fact that Pacific Stationery was not
necessarily claiming that the exemption for cooperative profit distribution was the only source for a self-regulatory
mandate. See supra note 141. The alleged violation was the expulsion of Pacific Stationery from the cooperative under
self-regulatory powers. These regulatory powers are both necessitated by industry structure and sanctioned by the
Robinson-Patman Act. The Court should not have confined its analysis to the statutory sources of the powers.
Indeed, as the Court noted, "[w]holesale purchasing cooperatives must establish and enforce reasonable rules in
order to function effectively." 105 S. Ct. 2613, 2620 (1985). The mandate for self-regulation obviously is based in
industry structure above and beyond the "narrow immunity" of the Robinson-Patman Act.
201. As the Court noted in NCAA v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of 0ka.: "Under the Sherman Act the criterion
to be used in judging the validity of a restraint on trade is its impact on competition." 468 U.S. 85, 104 (1984). This
seems to require a practical evaluation of the likely effects, rather than sources, of an allegedly anticompetitive activity.
See also Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1958).
202. I1 E. Kinrmm AND J. BAUER, supra note 116, at § 19.14.
203. Id.
204. The Robinson-Patman Act simply frees cooperatives from its prohibitions against price discrimination. See 15
U.S.C. § 13b (1982). In order to benefit from this provision, a party must maintain its membership in a cooperative, yet
control of a party's membership status is generally exercised by the cooperative under state law. Pacific Stationery &
Printing Co. v. Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc., 715 F.2d 1393, 1400 (9th Cir. 1983) (Norris, C.J., dissenting). In
Northwest Wholesale's case, an Oregon statute gives cooperatives great freedom in the regulation of membership, saying:
"Bylaws may provide for [the] termination of membership and the conditions and terms thereof." Or. Rev. Stat.
§ 62.145(3)(1984).
205. As the Circuit Court stated, "Excluding Pacific from enjoyment of such benefits may not be calculated to put
it out of business, but it must 'impair [its] ability to compete with the conspirators.' "715 F.2d 1393, 1397 (1983) (quoting
from Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hawaiian Oke & Liquors, Ltd., 416 F.2d 71, 77 (9th Cir. 1969)).
206. This is indicated by the narrowness of the immunity. See III E. KirmmR AND J. BAUER, supra note 116, at § 19.14
("The cooperatives exemption is limited to allowing a cooperative association to return to its members a pro rata share
of the savings effectuated by group buying or selling. In all other respects, cooperatives remain subject to the
Robinson-Patman Act."). See also Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co., 105 S. Ct.
2613, 2618 (1985) ("Section 4 of the Robinson-Patinan Act . . . is no more than a narrow immunity from the price
discrimination prohibitions of the Robinson-Patman Act itself.").
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achieve anticompetitive results, a lack of perceived breadth in the self-regulatory
mandate should not prevent the application of the Silver rule.
Second, and more significantly, the Silver opinion itself requires procedural
safeguards if there is a legislative mandate "or otherwise" 207 conferring self-
regulatory power. 208 Underlying this standard is a recognition that the source of the
mandate is irrelevant in determining whether procedural safeguards should be
required. Invariably, a mandate for self-regulation will be justified on the basis of
industry structure. 2 Whether Congress has had occasion to embody the structural
need for self-regulation in a broad statutory mandate should not be relevant in
assessing the need for process. The Court, in Northwest Wholesale, recognized that
"[w]holesale purchasing cooperatives must establish and enforce reasonable
rules in order to function effectively. ' '2 1 0 Thus, the need for self-regulation is
inherent in the nature of the industry. However, in determining the need for
procedural safeguards, the Court confined its analysis of the mandate to the portion
which was embodied in the Robinson-Patman Act. 21' Not only did this analysis fail
to account for the real breadth of the self-regulatory mandate, but it also failed to
account for all of the characteristics giving rise to an actual need for procedural
safeguards.
The Court's closing assertion that procedural safeguards can "in no sense
determine the antitrust analysis ''22 is equally questionable. While it is true that
procedural safeguards by themselves are never going to save a per se violation of the
Sherman Act,21 3 they should have a role in the antitrust analysis of industry
self-regulation. Assuming that the Court had found a group boycott normally
warranting application of the per se rule, the procedural safeguards would be relevant
in assessing the reasonableness of the trade association's assertions that their
self-regulatory activities were consistent with the scope of their mandate for
self-regulation. 2 14 Thus, the presence of safeguards does not determine whether the
207. See supra notes 107-11 and accompanying text.
208. See supra notes 104-06 and accompanying text.
209. For example, even in Silver, where the mandate was broadly embodied in the Securities Exchange Act, the
Court's analysis of the mandate was guided by "a consideration of both the economic role played by exchanges and the
historic setting of the Act." Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 349 (1963). It is difficult to conceive of a
situation in which a statutory mandate, whether implied or express, could not be equally justified by underlying structural
characteristics of the industry. Thus, it is difficult to discern any real distinction between mandates embodied in statutes
and those derived from the needs of a particular industry.
210. Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co., 105 S. Ct. 2613, 2620 (1985).
211. After finding that the Robinson-Patman Act did not embody a broad Congressional mandate for industry
self-regulation, the Court decided that "[n]o need exists, therefore, to narrow the Sherman Act in order to accommodate
any competing congressional policy requiring discretionary self-policing." 105 S. Ct. 2613, 2619 (1985) (emphasis
added). This ignores the possibility that the Silver due process requirement might apply to mandates for self-regulation
under the "or otherwise" language of the Silver opinion.
212. Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co., 105 S. Ct. 2613, 2619 (1985).
213. Procedural safeguards are only relevant in the antitrust analysis of a group boycott after two other circumstances
have been shown to be present. See infra note 214.
214. Assuming that the likelihood of anticompetitive consequences is based on the denial of a share of profits for
Pacific, the argument of a party in the position of Northwest Wholesale to remove the expulsion from the per se role would
assert that: (1) the Robinson-Patman Act and the nature of trade associations warrant both self-regulation of membership
and the distribution of profits thereto, (2) the expulsion of Pacific is reasonably-related and narrowly-tailored to
accomplish an end consistent with the policies underlying their self-regulatory power, and (3) procedural safeguards were
provided. See Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Management, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1049 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
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act is a group boycott warranting per se analysis, but it is relevant in the assessment
of whether exempting the boycott from that analysis is reasonable. 215
C. A More Appropriate Role for Procedural Safeguards
If the preliminary analysis had found that, absent the Robinson-Patman Act, the
expulsion of Pacific Stationery and the resulting denial of trade association relation-
ships would amount to a group boycott warranting per se analysis, an effort by
Northwest Wholesale to justify the activity in light of the Robinson-Patman Act
would bring the Silver decision into play. 216 Aside from its requirement of procedure,
Silver requires that collective activity under a grant of self-regulatory power be
intended to accomplish an end consistent with the policy underlying the grant of
power,2 17 that it be reasonably related to this end, 218 and that it be no more extensive
than necessary in its intrusion on the antitrust laws.2 19 In the context of Northwest
Wholesale, such analysis would focus on whether the stock disclosure rule was
intended to further the effective functioning of cooperatives, whether the rule was
reasonably related to this policy, and whether the expulsion was excessive in light of
the Congressional concern for full and fair competition.
The due process rule is imposed to help the courts make this analysis and guard
against arbitrary or anticompetitive activities by the cooperative. 220 With such a
record, a court could find indicators of the cooperative's motives, the circumstances
relevant to an assessment of reasonableness, and evidence of good faith efforts by the
cooperative to minimize any conceivable anticompetitive effects. The record would
also serve to preserve and establish evidence of an industry practice or custom. A lack
of a hearing or explanation will leave the record potentially devoid of evidence of
actual intent, purpose, and reasonability. Therefore, regardless of the breadth of any
statutory embodiments of an inherent need for industry self-regulation, procedural
safeguards should be required whenever mandated self-regulation might otherwise
constitute an illegal group boycott.
D. Another Context for Procedural Safeguards: The Rule of Reason
Having found that the group boycott in Northwest Wholesale was not one
warranting per se analysis, the Court remanded the case for a review of the District
Court's rule of reason analysis. 221 Implicit in this holding is the belief that the
expulsion was not an activity that can be found voidable without further inquiry.
When a threshold analysis finds that a group boycott does not warrant the per se rule,
215. Id.
216. See, e.g., Pacific Stationery & Printing Co. v. Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc., 715 F.2d 1393, 1397 (9th
Cir. 1983), rev'd, 105 S. Ct. 2613 (1985).
217. Id. See Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341,357 (1963); Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Management,
Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1049, 1064-65 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
218. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co. v. Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc., 715 F.2d 1393,1397 (9th Cir. 1983).
219. Id.
220. Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 361-63 (1963).
221. Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co., 105 S. Ct. 2613, 2621-22 (1985).
[Vol. 47:729
INDUSTRIAL SELF-REGULATORY BOYCOTTS
the rule of reason test is employed.m2 In this situation, the analysis will no longer
focus on the existence and scope of a mandate for industry self-regulation and the
provision of procedural safeguards will no longer be required. 223 The presence or
absence of procedural safeguards, however, may be relevant to this analysis. The rule
of reason standard evaluates the capacity of an activity to "suppress or even destroy
competition," 2 4 and the facts relevant to such an inquiry are numerous. 22- Evidence
of the intent and purpose of the parties is relevant to assist the court in assessing facts
and predicting consequences. 226 When industry self-regulation involves the exclusion
of competitors from access to relationships or the receipt of benefits relevant to full
and fair competition and market efficiency, the denial of a hearing or explanation may
be probative into the concern of the group with using its powers in good faith.
Conversely, the presence of a hearing or explanation will indicate a willingness by the
group to avoid arbitrariness. Additionally, a record of a hearing will be of great
assistance to a court in determining the motives and reasonability of the parties and
their actions.2 27 The low cost and ease of providing procedural protections makes
their presence even more indicative of reasonableness.2 28 Therefore, even in a review
of a self-regulatory group boycott that does not depend on a mandate for self-
regulatory power to escape per se invalidation, the presence of procedural safeguards
is relevant to antitrust analysis.
V. CONCLUSION
The Sherman Act's concern with preserving full and fair competition requires
that courts diligently maintain and develop an antitrust paradigm suited to the
contemporary marketplace.2 29 Business associations like Northwest Wholesale are
often given a quasi-governmental role in our economy, as it sometimes becomes
necessary and efficient to allocate to these institutions a measure of self-regulatory
power. When an industry's nature requires the recognition of a mandate for
self-regulation, whether the mandate is embodied in a statute or not, the industry does
not acquire the right to misuse the power in derogation of competition.230 Thus, while
Northwest Wholesale has the power to engage in a self-regulatory group boycott that
might otherwise constitute a per se violation of the antitrust laws,23 1 it should not
have the right to conduct its boycott in an unreasonable manner. The mandated
self-regulatory activity of the industry should be removed from per se analysis only
when the activity is the type of activity that was perceived as the procompetitive
justification for the grant of power. 3 2
222. See generally I E. KumzR, supra note 31, at §§ 8.2-.3; H. Hovamx',-P, supra note 4, at § 4.4.
223. Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co., 105 S. Ct. 2613, 2621-22 (1985).
224. Board of Trade of the City of Chicago v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
225. I E. Kmrmm, supra note 31, at § 8.3.
226. Id. at §§ 8.2-.3.
227. See supra notes 185-91 and accompanying text.
228. See Note, supra note 15.
229. See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
230. See Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
231. See supra notes 216-20 and accompanying text.
232. See supra notes 104-11 and accompanying text.
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An effective means for ensuring that collective actors adhere in good faith to the
goals of the mandate of their self-regulatory power is the requirement of procedural
safeguards in the use of the power. Thus, a group that argues that its group boycott
should be exempted from the per se rule against group boycotts should be required to
show one of two situations. First, during a threshold analysis of the group boycott,
the group could assert that circumstances are such that the presumed likelihood of
anticompetitive consequences is inapplicable. The burden should be on the group to
overcome this presumption in a preliminary review by a court. Second, even if per
se analysis would normally be appropriate, the group could assert that the boycott was
imposed reasonably and not excessively in furtherance of a goal underlying a grant,
legislative or otherwise, of self-regulatory power. Here, the group must also show
that it extended procedural protections in a good faith effort to avoid arbitrariness and
to maximize full and fair competition.
When the group successfully demonstrates in the threshold analysis that the per
se rule should not be applicable, the rule of reason inquiry will follow. The presence
or absence of procedural safeguards also should be relevant in this analysis. In both
contexts, the presence of process guards against a misuse or arbitrary use of industrial
self-regulatory power, supporting any group argument that it has made a good faith
effort to preserve full and fair competition. Requiring such a safeguard will help
enhance the effectiveness of the antitrust laws when self-regulatory power is
conferred upon an industry.
David E. Ledman
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